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Abstract—The recent introduction of new DNA sequencing
techniques caused the amount of processed and stored biological
data to skyrocket. In order to process these vast amounts of
data, bio-centers have been tempted to use low-cost public clouds.
However, genomes are privacy sensitive, since they store personal
information about their donors, such as their identity, disease
risks, heredity and ethnic origin. The first critical DNA processing
step that can be executed in a cloud, i.e., read alignment, consists
in finding the location of the DNA sequences produced by a
sequencing machine in the human genome. While recent devel-
opments aim at increasing performance, only few approaches
address the need for fast and privacy preserving read alignment
methods. This paper introduces MaskAl, a novel approach for
read alignment. MaskAl combines a fast preprocessing step on
raw genomic data — filtering and masking — with established
algorithms to align sanitized reads, from which sensitive parts
have been masked out, and refines the alignment score using the
masked out information with Intel’s software guard extensions
(SGX). MaskAl is a highly competitive privacy-preserving read
alignment software that can be massively parallelized with public
clouds and emerging enclave clouds. Finally, MaskAl is nearly
as accurate as plain-text approaches (more than 96% of aligned
reads with MaskAl compared to 98% with BWA) and can process
alignment workloads 87% faster than current privacy-preserving
approaches while using less memory and network bandwidth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the molecule that encodes
genetic information with an alphabet of four nucleotides: ade-
nine (A), thymine (T), guanine (G), and cytosine (C). Thanks
to the development of next-generation sequencing (NGS) tech-
nologies, DNA sequencing (i.e., the process of determining
the order of nucleotides inside a DNA molecule) has been
getting more affordable. For example, currently sequencing a
human genome is estimated to cost around 1,000 US dollars.
Moreover, with the associations between genomes and disease
risks, phenotypes, or ethnicity, getting more precise, it is
expected that studying genomes will enable progress in fields
such as personalized and preventive medicine, genome editing,
and forensics [1], [2]. Consequently, the production rate of
genomic data has been greatly increasing all over the world [3].
During DNA sequencing, raw genomic data is acquired
from a biological sample, and consists in millions of short
DNA sequences (called reads) randomly sampled from a
donor’s genome. This raw data then go through a processing
pipeline, whose final output is the donor’s genome, a sequence
of over 3 thousand million pairs of nucleotides. In the first
step of this processing pipeline, the reads are aligned against a
known reference genome, i.e., their position in the genome is
identified. After the position of each read has been determined,
scientists can identify the biological information the read
contains through variant calling, which is the process of finding
gene sequence variations between genomes.
However, processing and storing human sequenced data
raises new privacy challenges [4]. Indeed, several privacy
attacks have been described in the literature. Among them,
the identification of a donor of publicly available Y-STR
haplotypes information [5], and the discovery of a donor’s
predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease [6]. Further risks include
the possibility of leaked data to not only affect the donor in her
lifetime, but also her relatives over generations. These attacks
raised concerns about the possibility that leaked, or inferred,
genomic data may be used to discriminate people in their
everyday life [7] (e.g., to modify interest rates, deny health
insurances, influence the selection of employees).
The access to critical private information (CPI) contained
or linked to genomes is enabled thanks to an adversary using,
or observing, one or several kinds of genomic variations:
(i) short tandem repeats (STRs), where a short pattern is
repeated a variable number of times; (ii) mutations (SNPs),
insertions and deletions (indels), and copy number variations
(CNVs); or (iii) disease-associated genes [8]. These CPI items
represent up to 0.5% of a full genome, encode the differences
between individuals [9], and can already be observed in raw
genomic data. Therefore, in order to avoid data leakage and
prevent privacy attacks, there is an urgent need to develop
privacy preserving methods for DNA alignment, genomic data
transfers and storage. In particular, currently used alignment
approaches manipulate raw genomic data in plain-text and
may run in public clouds. However, typically, clouds do not
guarantee that the data cannot be accessed by either the cloud
service provider, or an intruder [10]. Several works therefore
highlighted the risks associated to the inconsiderate use of
clouds for bio-medical data [11], [12].
To answer the need for privacy, secure alignment algo-
rithms have been described in the literature. However, they sac-
rifice performance for security, and are much slower than plain-
text algorithms [13], [14]. Garbled circuits alignment [15]
and homomorphic encryption schemes [16] have been used
to perform operations on encrypted reads. Recently, more
practical solutions appeared. These solutions try to combine
high performance and security by making controlled compro-
mises on their security guarantees. Chen et al. [17] proposed a
seed-and-extend alignment implementation for hybrid clouds.
The initial ideas and limitations of this work inspired another
solution, Balaur [18], which minimizes the use of a private
cloud by relying on Locally Sensitive Hashing (LSH), secure
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k-mer voting, and a MinHash algorithm. However, Balaur uses
a lot of memory and requires heavy network transfers.
The challenge we address in this paper is the design of
a lightweight alignment method that enforces the privacy of
the genomic information contained in the reads, and yet can
maintain a high performance by relying on widely available
public clouds.
We propose MaskAl, a competitive approach for privacy-
preserving read alignment using masked reads and Intel’s Soft-
ware Guard eXtensions (SGX). MaskAl is a two-tier hybrid
system that uses an early stage filtering method to protect reads
as soon as they are produced by the sequencing machines. The
first tier (i.e., masked alignment) aligns masked reads in public
clouds, and the second tier (i.e., score refinement) refines the
results of the first tier by using an SGX implementation of the
Smith-Waterman (SW) algorithm. Both steps can be massively
parallelized on cheap public clouds (e.g., Amazon AWS) and
trusted execution environments (e.g., Intel SGX). We therefore
believe MaskAl to be an important step towards practical
privacy enforcement during reads alignment, which is today
routinely executed in insecure public clouds for performance
and cost reasons.
An important key feature of our approach is the usage of
SGX, Intel’s newest Trusted Execution Environment (TEE),
which protects applications against attack vectors heading from
the operating system or hypervisor layer as well as attack
vectors from the hardware layer. SGX uses a special hardware
extension in the Memory Management Unit (MMU) called
Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) for storing enclave code
in a specific, cryptographically secured region in the RAM
called Processor Reserved Memory (PRM) to ensure the same
speed for SGX applications and non-SGX applications. Due
to hardware limitations, the PRM has a maximum size of
128MB per Socket. In the literature, SGX has been used for
privacy sensitive operations in the clouds, such as private web
search [19], or MapReduce [20].
The main contribution of this work consists in the design of
a privacy-preserving read alignment method, MaskAl, which
uses SGX enclaves to securely refine the alignment scores in a
public cloud, requiring access to the full reads. MaskAl is both
practical, because it relies mostly on widely available public
clouds, and efficient, since it is faster (no costly encryptions
or network communications) and lighter (it only requires tens
of GB of RAM) than the state-of-the-art methods. More
specifically, the individual contributions of MaskAl can be
detailed as follows:
1) We show how to efficiently partition reads in two sets,
a privacy sensitive one and an insensitive one, based on the
output of a state-of-the-art reads filter.
2) We design a hybrid cloud-based alignment scheme, which
makes use of a public cloud, a private cloud, and an enclave
cloud (i.e., a public cloud with TEEs).
3) We provide a performance and accuracy evaluation of
MaskAl that shows its practicality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II details our system and threat models. Section III gives
an overview of MaskAl, briefly explaining its processing steps
and its architecture. Section IV recalls the principles of a read
filter [21] that MaskAl uses to create insensitive and sensitive
versions of reads, depending on whether or not they carry
genomic variations. Section V-B describes MaskAl’s approach
in detail, which uses sensitive and insensitive versions in a
privacy preserving and efficient way. Section VI details the
read alignment verification and refinement that MaskAl exe-
cutes in SGX enclaves. Section VII provides the performance
evaluation we ran on MaskAl and on state-of-the-art alignment
algorithms. Section VIII provides an overview of the related
works. Finally, Section IX concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
A. System model
We consider a scenario where a bio-center receives a
biological sample, e.g., in the form of blood or saliva probes,
from a donor, and uses one of its sequencing machines to
digitize the DNA it contains. We assume that this bio-center
has limited computing resources, and wants to rely on public
clouds to scale for economical reasons. Therefore, the system
architecture we consider makes use of public, private and
enclave clouds to enforce the privacy of the sensitive data
contained in reads, and maintain a high throughput.
Public clouds are server farms which can be rented, like
Amazon AWS, or Google Cloud. These machines are very
cheap and everything related to them can be or is managed by
outsourced third-parties (maintaining the systems, operational
tasks or even development tasks). Typically, public clouds do
not guarantee that the data will never be accessed by either
the cloud service provider, or an intruder [10]. In particular,
in the bio-medical field, several works highlighted the risks
associated to the inconsiderate use of public clouds for bio-
medical data [11], [12], [22], [23].
Enclave clouds are SGX-powered public clouds that guar-
antee secure data operations inside the enclaves. We assume
the costs for an hour of operation in public clouds and enclave
clouds to be equally low, as newer Intel CPUs usually support
SGX. Given the technical restriction of 128MB protected per
SGX CPU, it could be possible that more SGX nodes are
needed for parallelization, as multi-threading on one CPU
would divide the usable PRM by the number of threads. Due
to the technical restrictions neither the full alignment nor the
filtering step can suitably be done inside an enclave today.
However, the used SGX based enclaves could be replaced by
any other suitable TEE.
Private clouds contain servers hosted by the bio-company
or the research center who own the sequencing machines.
The owner of these machines has full control over both the
hardware (i.e., physical and virtual) and the software stack
of these machines, to enforce the highest possible security
level. Maintaining and using private clouds is obviously more
expensive than using the two previous kinds of clouds we pre-
sented, which encourages bio-companies and research centers
to offload their computations to public clouds. Filtering will
take place here – since filtering is a fast and very inexpensive
operation compared to a full alignment in private clouds.
B. Threat model
Privacy and raw reads. We consider an honest-but-
curious adversary located in the cloud whose goal is to infer
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privacy-sensitive information about the donor whose genome
is sequenced. This adversary would first rely on raw genomic
sequences it may be able to observe during the alignment of a
subject’s reads. If the adversary is able to align those reads, as
the legitimate workflow is trying to, and identify the genomic
variations they carry, a trail attack becomes possible [24],
[25]. In such an attack, DNA samples are matched to their
identified subject through the use of unique distinguishing
features in different institutions where the subject leaves traces
of his genome. For example, if a donor later participates in
a public bio-medical study, the adversary may be able to
identify the subject in the results based on her known genomic
characteristics, and infer private information (e.g., that the
donor suffers from a disease associated with the study). Read
alignment is therefore the first stage in the genomic pipeline
where privacy-sensitive genomic features can be observed by
an adversary, if they are not protected [10].
Trusted execution environment (TEE). We assume that
the TEEs we use for secure computation in clouds, i.e.,
Intel SGX enclaves, are secure. As [26], [27], [28] showed
recently, it is possible with common side channel attacks like
PRIME+PROBE to leak confidential information from the
cache. However, mitigation methods for the mentioned side
channel attacks discussed in [26], [28] can be used by the
enclave developers.
Cryptography and enclave initialization. We store all
data needed by the Smith-Waterman algorithm (i.e., the ref-
erence genome and the full reads) encrypted on the enclave
clouds, to prevent any inference attack based on the accesses an
enclave would perform on these data structures. More specifi-
cally, we rely on AES128-GSM as it is integrated in the SGX
SDK to encrypt the plain-text reads and the reference genome
frames, and store them in the main memory of the machine
hosting the enclave. In addition, we encrypt communications
between the various types of clouds using RSA2048, and
assume that the adversary is not able to decrypt encrypted
communications. Deploying an enclave would successively
consist in its remote attestation and its initialization with the
encrypted data structure, sent over the network.
III. MASKED ALIGNMENT OVERVIEW
Given our threat and system models, we propose a modified
read alignment workflow based on the partitioning of reads
at the nucleotide level. Right after it has been generated by
a sequencing machine, the location of a read in the human
genome is unknown. It is only after its alignment that a read’s
location is known, and therefore whether or not it carries
sensitive information. We rely on a state of the art read filter
to identify the nucleotides that are potentially sensitive.
The main idea behind our approach is to use masked reads
to perform privacy-preserving read alignment on public clouds
with existing state-of-the-art alignment algorithms to avoid
much more expensive private clouds. Indeed, as we show
later (see Figure 3), it is possible to align masked reads in
public clouds, in a privacy-preserving manner, using existing
alignment algorithms with a true positive rate of at least 96%.
Figure 1 provides an overview of MaskAl’s alignment
scheme. We detail its main steps in the following.
Public Cloud Enclave Cloud
Biocenter
1
2
SequencingPr
iv
at
e 
C
lo
ud
Pu
bl
ic
 C
lo
ud
 
0
Reads Filter
Fig. 1. Overview of MaskAl’s network flows: (0) filtering of raw reads
(FASTA or FASTQ files); (1) alignment of masked reads (SAM files) in
a public cloud and transmission of the results back to the bio-center; (2)
encrypted transmission of the reads to an enclave and refinement of the
alignment scores
Step 0 [Reads filtering and masking] After reads have
been sequenced, the bio-center associates to each of them a
header that contains its anonymous donor’s ID and its read
ID. Reads are then filtered using the read filter we introduce
in Section IV. During the filtering process, the nucleotides of
each read are either classified as sensitive or insensitive. Reads
are then partitioned in two versions, one which contains only
the sensitive nucleotides, and the other one which contains only
insensitive nucleotides and hide the length of sensitive sections.
Indeed, since genomic variations can have different lengths,
the length of sensitive sequences in the insensitive version of
a read is hidden (collapsing of the hiding symbols), so that
the insensitive version of a read never reveals any information.
The filtering and the masking of reads can take place either
in the sequencing machine or in a private cloud directly after
sequencing.
Step 1 [Masked reads alignment] The sensitive version
of reads remains securely stored inside the private cloud, while
the insensitive version of reads is sent to the public cloud. We
use cryptographic mechanisms to ensure the integrity of the
reads. The alignment of the insensitive versions of the reads
is performed in the public cloud. The original reads received
by the public cloud from the bio-center are returned to the
bio-center, along with the candidate alignment position that
the public cloud obtained. The data transferred for the masked
alignment is limited to a file containing the masked reads (in
a FASTQ or FASTA file format) and a file that contains the
alignment results (in the SAM file format).
Remark 1. Depending on the reads properties, the align-
ment process may be stopped here, namely if the vast majority
of the reads have been correctly aligned to the reference
genome. Otherwise, the process continues with step 2. In this
case, the processing could be optimized by having the public
cloud sending the candidate positions directly to the enclave
cloud. We do not present this option here for simplicity.
Step 2 [Alignment score refinement] A second step,
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performed in enclaves, may be needed for two reasons: (i)
it is not possible to compute a reliable alignment score based
only on the masked version of reads; and (ii) the few reads
that have not been correctly aligned during masked alignment
can be identified, and if necessary tentatively realigned in
a secure environment. The bio-center sends the encrypted
full reads, and their candidate alignment positions obtained
during Step 1, to the enclave cloud. The enclaves validate
and refine the possible candidate positions for each read using
the full read’s unmasked information. Since the enclave cloud
is a trusted environment, the alignment score refinement can
use the unmasked (plain-text) read instead of the masked
representation. Besides refining the alignment positions of
reads, this step also detects reads whose candidate positions
are incorrect. Reads may have been incorrectly aligned by the
public cloud because they contain too many sequencing errors,
or because they contain too many sensitive nucleotides. After
obtaining the results of the alignment score refinement, the
enclave replies to the bio-center with the read IDs and their
alignment position, and alignment score.
Remark 2. As we show in Figure 3, the proportion of
misaligned reads is small enough to be ignored. Indeed, variant
calling, the processing step that follows read alignment in the
genomic workflow, can tolerate some unaligned or misaligned
reads. Otherwise, if one would absolutely want to realign those
reads, they would have to be aligned inside the private cloud
in plain-text, or using state-of-the-art secure algorithms in the
public cloud.
IV. READS FILTERING AND MASKING
In this section, we briefly describe a recent filtering
method [21] that detects sensitive nucleotides in genomic se-
quences of arbitrary lengths, which we use in MaskAl to create
a privacy insensitive (i.e., that does not carry known genomic
variations), as well as complementary sensitive version of the
reads. In the following, we recall the main ideas the long
reads filter is built on, and refer to the full article for the
implementation and evaluation details.
The long reads filtering (LRF) approach can be described
in three main steps: dictionaries generation, Bloom filters
initialization, and reads filtering. LRF receives as input a read,
directly at the mouth of a sequencing machine, and outputs
two complementary reads. The first one contains only letters
that are not part of genomic variations, and therefore can be
manipulated in plain-text in public clouds, while the second
one contains letters which are suspected to be part of a genomic
variation, and therefore has to be transmitted encrypted, or
manipulated inside an enclave, according to our threat model.
Dictionaries generation consists of collecting all the known
variations in the 1000 Genomes Project, and reconstructing
their neighboring regions using the nucleotides from the refer-
ence human genome used to describe them. Since individuals
present combinations of several genomic variations, located at
different locations, the LRF then enumerates all theoretically
possible combinations of the collected genomic variations.
Then, the LRF creates sequences of K = 33 nucleotides
from these combinations to build the dictionaries, where dicti
denotes the dictionary that contain sequences of K nucleotides
whose ith nucleotide is sensitive ((K, i)-sensitive sequences).
> ID 001
ATGCTGCTGA
> ID 002
ATTGCCGATG
> ID 001
AGTGACGTA
> ID 002
CGATGCACGA
Reads
2.Reads 
ltering
> ID 001
---GAC---
> ID 001
AGTNGTA
privacy sensitive 
nucleotides
privacy insensitive
nucleotides
> ID 002
------ACGA
> ID 002
CGATGCN
> ID 002
ATNCCNG
> ID 001
NTGCTGA
> ID 002
--TG--GAT-
> ID 001
ATGC------
GVs
STRs
DAGs
Fig. 2. Infrastructure and workflow overview. Phase 1 represents the
sequencing of a genome, which produces DNA reads. Phase 2 represents the
detection of the sensitive nucleotides in reads based on the read filter, and the
partitioning of reads according to their sensitive and insensitive versions.
The long read filter creates one or several Bloom fil-
ters [29], [30], and initializes them from the previously gen-
erated dictionaries of (K, i)-sensitive sequences. To tolerate
sequencing errors the long read filter relies on several dictio-
naries, using one Bloom filter per dictionary.
Finally, filtering the reads consists in moving a sliding win-
dow of size K over them and testing whether all subsequences
have been inserted in one of the Bloom filters. More precisely,
when the sequence contained in one of the studied windows
matches one Bloom filter, say the one initialized with the
(K, i)-sensitive sequences, then its ith nucleotide is tagged
sensitive. This way, for each detection of a sequence in a
Bloom filter, only one nucleotide is detected sensitive.
Depending on the positions of the nucleotides in the
sequences that the filter is able to detect as sensitive, some
nucleotides either at the end, or at the beginning, of a read, may
not be detected sensitive. These nucleotides are preventively
treated sensitive (masked). However, this effect is attenuated
once several Bloom filters are used, initialized with different
sensitive positions. Finally, the evaluation of LRF shows that,
given known privacy attacks, the privacy of donors is protected,
since attackers are not given access to enough privacy sensitive
information (around 7 SNPs per genome).
V. MASKED READS ALIGNMENT
A. Read partitioning
The output of the filter consists of the input read along
with a set of the nucleotides flagged as sensitive. Revealing
the insensitive nucleotides of a subject does not reveal any
distinctive information, since by definition they are common
to all subjects.
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After the nucleotides of a read have been either tagged as
sensitive or insensitive, MaskAl then divides a read into two
complementary parts, which can be reunited if needed. More
specifically, in the insensitive version of a read, we replace
regions of consecutive sensitive letters by an ’N’ (i.e., the green
file in Figure 2), so that no information is revealed about the
hidden section, and all privacy insensitive letters are replaced
by a ’-’ in the privacy sensitive version of a read (i.e., the
red file in Figure 2). In practice, MaskAl keeps only the full
version of a read, and its privacy insensitive version.
B. Masked reads alignment
Our first design choice consisted in selecting a plain-
text alignment algorithm, among the many that have been
developed recently [31], [14], [32], [13], [33] to align masked
reads to the reference genome in public clouds.
To do so, we considered two representatives of two differ-
ent algorithm families: (1) LAST [33] as a representative of
hashmap based algorithms; and (2) BWA [13] as a representa-
tive of suffix tree based algorithms. We chose LAST because
it has the ability to find weak matches with big gaps better
than other algorithms in its category, which we assumed would
help given the nucleotides that MaskAl masks in the reads.
According to its high performance in both multi- and single-
threaded scenarios we chose BWA as a representative for FM-
index based algorithms. In practice, we found out that BWA
has a higher performance and better accuracy than LAST, even
with masked reads.
We performed alignment experiments on simulated masked
reads using LAST and BWA, and measured their accuracy, but
also their performance and memory footprint.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the alignment precision using masked and unmasked
reads with BWA and LAST.
Figure 3 presents the proportion of the input reads that
have been correctly aligned when applying BWA and LAST.
Experiments have been performed on both masked and un-
masked versions of the reads, to observe the impact of masking
reads. Without masking, BWA is able to align between 98%
and 99.9% correctly, while LAST can align between 95% and
99%. However, BWA aligns masked reads significantly more
accurately than LAST (e.g., with reads of 1000 nucleotides
and 2% error rate LAST aligns 84% of the reads and BWA
99%). In addition, the alignment accuracy of BWA on masked
reads is always higher than 96%, which proves that aligning
masked reads provides a good accuracy.
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Fig. 4. Alignment times for masked reads using BWA and LAST.
In addition to a higher accuracy, we observed that BWA is
also faster than LAST. Figure 4 shows that, on the same sets of
masked reads, BWA is always at least one order of magnitude
faster than LAST. Moreover, BWA uses special data structures
(FM-index) which need less resources (memory and time) than
LAST.
After those experiments, it makes sense to rely on BWA
to align masked reads. The output of BWA on masked reads
is made of candidate alignment positions. Indeed, BWA cuts
a read into several sections, delimited by the N characters we
introduced during the masking of reads, which it individually
tries to align.
VI. ALIGNMENT SCORE REFINEMENT IN SGX ENCLAVES
In this section, we first present the final step of the reads
alignment, which consists in refining the alignment scores
around the candidate locations found during the alignment
of the masked reads. This alignment refinement is executed
in SGX enclaves for privacy, since the full version of the
reads has to be used. Then, we recall how the algorithm
we implemented in enclaves works — namely the Smith-
Waterman algorithm — and explain how we adapted it so that
it would run inside enclaves using limited memory.
A. Score refinement and alignment extension
After several candidate positions have been identified for
a read, MaskAl verifies which one is the most accurate by
comparing the region around the candidate positions with the
read. In practice, the overhead of this verification is reasonable,
since the alignment verification is computed in a small region
around the alignment candidate matching positions. This veri-
fication phase is similar to the extend phase of many alignment
algorithms, and therefore could replace it in those algorithms.
In practice, we chose not to execute both the masked alignment
and the extension in enclaves on the same machines, to
eliminate attacks on correlated encrypted messages (i.e., the
masked reads and the encrypted reads).
Since this step requires the full reads, we execute it inside
an Intel SGX enclave. Compared to other TEEs like ARM
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TrustZone, we chose to use SGX since Intel ships it with out-
of-the-box abilities like local and remote attestation, and with a
user friendly development environment. Those features can be
criticized, as the infrastructure provided by Intel poses a single
point of failure and an attack vector for very sophisticated
attackers. However, note that this is just one prototype option
for our method. In fact, the enclave cloud we use could be
replaced by any trusted execution cloud environment.
B. The Smith-Waterman algorithm
The Smith-Waterman algorithm (SW) [34], [35] is used
to estimate the local alignment of two strings. SW compares
segments of all possible lengths with an edit-distance-based
similarity measurement. In particular, the two strings are
compared character by character, and matches, mismatches
and deletions are weighted differently. The local alignment
estimates the longest most similar fragment of two strings.
To calculate the local alignment, SW uses a computing
matrix M (see Table I). Row 0 of M contains the reference
string and column 0 contains the sequence to align. Both
strings have an empty character added in front of the first letter.
To initialize the computing matrix M, each element of M is
initialized with 0. Besides the computing matrix M there is also
a so called traceback matrix T, which helps to reassemble the
correct alignment after computing M. T is initially a copy of
initialized matrix M. In addition to the four edit-distance score
cases (insertion, deletion, match and mismatch), SW introduces
a fourth case: 0. The value of an element M(n,m) is computed
according to Figure 5.
ε A C G T A
ε 0 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 2 1 0 0 2
G 0 0 0 3 2 1
T 0 0 0 2 4 3
C 0 0 2 1 3 3
ε A C G T A
ε 0 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 D L 0 0 0
G 0 0 0 D 0 0
T 0 0 0 0 D 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE I. SMITH-WATERMAN SCORE MATRIX (LEFT) AND
TRACEBACK MATRIX (RIGHT). THE WEIGHTS USED ARE:
MATCH/MISMATCH 2/-1 AND GAP PENALTY: -1. THE ALIGNMENT RESULT
ACCORDING TO BOTH TABLES IS ”ACGT” AND ”A-GT”
To get the correct local alignment, SW fills a second
matrix T, which stores the solution directions. An element
in the backtracking matrix T is either D (diagonal), L (left)
or U (upper). D, L and U are the directions, to find the
predecessor of an element. If M(i,j) was chosen because the
match-mismatch case gave the maximum value, T(i,j) equals
D, the diagonal direction. It is called diagonal, because the
match-mismatch computation uses the value of M(i-1, j-1),
and position (i-1,j-1) is in fact the upper diagonal to (i,j).
Following the same pattern, insertion equals U and deletion
equals L, because insertion uses the upper neighbor whereas
deletion uses the left neighbor to compute the element (see
Figure 5). To find the actual alignment result, backtracking
starts at the position of the element in M with the highest
value. Starting from there, backtracking takes the same way
backwards by parsing the directions of the backtracking matrix.
Smith-Waterman’s backtracking terminates whenever the value
of a reached element in the backtracking matrix is 0. This
guarantees that only the best fitting fragment of a sequence is
computed. A comprehensive example of the Smith-Waterman
algorithm is shown in Table I.
Scorei,j = max

0
Scorei−1,j−1 + 2 : u = v
Scorei−1,j−1 +(−1) : u 6= v
Scorei,j−1 +(−1) : insertion
Scorei−1,j +(−1) : deletion
Fig. 5. Scoring function for Smith-Waterman algorithm example: u,v are the
characters of the two strings which are currently compared
C. Running the SW algorithm in SGX enclaves
To perform the Smith-Waterman algorithm for each read
in an enclave, an adequate reference frame is needed. Tradi-
tionally, the Smith-Waterman algorithm is performed with a
read and the complete reference DNA (i.e., a sequence of 3
Gigabases). Fortunately, by aligning a masked read with BWA,
the result will be, in at least 96% of the cases, a position within
an offset of 50 nucleotides. Therefore, we use a shortened
reference for our enclave based SW algorithm. The shortened
reference is cut starting 50 nucleotides (nt) before the actual
candidate position (candidate position - 50) with the length of
the aligned read plus 50nt.
Running the Smith-Waterman algorithm in SGX enclaves
present some difficulty, since enclaves have a limited memory
(128MB in total ca. 90MB usable) that the algorithm tends
to exhaust very quickly. We circumvented this problem by
assuming the maximum length of the reads to be aligned
to 1000 nucleotides. We chose a maximum length of 1000
because of two reasons: firstly, 1000 nucleotides easily fit into
an enclave, so that an enclave could handle two threads in
parallel; and secondly, many of current sequencing techniques
are producing reads of less than 1000 nucleotides. This current
limitation of our prototype may disappear in the future, if
future versions of SGX extend or even remove their current
memory limitation.
To reduce the network traffic we assume that the reference
resides in encrypted overlapping chunks of 2000 nucleotides
on each enclave. We use overlapping segments of the reference
genome to avoid having a read located on two chunks, which
would incur more encryptions and decryptions for the enclaves.
To execute the validation, the enclave application uses an
hashmap to find the correct encrypted reference slice and
decrypts it, together with the encrypted unmasked read into
the enclave’s Processor Reserved Memory (PRM). Then, SW
is executed with the shortened reference and the unmasked
read. After the score refinement step, the requesting bio-center
receives the alignment result encrypted.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental settings
Data sources. We rely on the genomic variations and the
individual genomes from the 1000 Genomes Project [36],
along with the short tandem repeats from the Tandem Repeats
Database [37] to create the dictionaries of sensitive sequences,
and filter individual genomes. We use the Phase 3 20130502
release of the 1000 Genomes Project, and the associated
GRCh37 reference genome against which we align reads.
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Hardware. For our experiments we used three environments,
which correspond to the public, private and enclave machines.
The first machine, which corresponds to the private cloud, is
a quad socket Intel Xeon E5-4650 v3 processor with 12 cores
running at 2.10 GHz. We used this first machine to perform the
filtering step used in MaskAl. This machine is equipped with
190 GB of RAM, and has 15 TB of disk storage. The second
machine, which represents the public cloud, is an HPC shared
machine equipped with Intel Xeon E7-4850 processors where
we used 30 threads for our tests. This machine is equipped with
1 TB RAM and disposes of up to 150 GB of hard disk. We
relied on this machine for the experiments with Balaur, which
required more memory than our local machine possesses. We
emulated the enclave cloud with a desktop machine containing
Intel i7-6700 processors. We consider a common network
bandwidth of 1Gbit/s between the private cloud, where the
sequencing machine is hosted, and the public cloud, which
contains both enclave-less and enclave-equipped processors.
Software. All parts of our prototype are written in C/C++. We
used the official Intel SGX SDK in version 1.9 and run the code
on Ubuntu (16.04 LTS). To run Smith-Waterman securely in
the enclave, we created an ECALL which takes the encrypted
reads as parameter, decrypts them inside the PRM and run
Smith-Waterman with the plain data inside the enclave. We
assumed the availability of a working secure remote attestation
infrastructure and transport layer encryption. Since alignment
is a massively parallelized application, we expect MaskAl to
scale linearly with the number of enclaves used, and therefore
study its performance when running on a single thread.
Simulated reads. We perform experiments on simulated reads
that we generate using wgsim [38] and the GRCh37 reference
genome. We used the simulated reads to evaluate the alignment
algorithms with a wide range of realistic read parameters
(e.g. reads length, error rate) to mimic reads from different
sequencing technologies. We follow the characteristics of
existing sequencing technologies to combine these parameters.
The lengths of the reads span from 150 to 1000 nucleotides,
while we consider error rates of 1% and 2%. In each category,
we simulated 100000 reads from the entire human genome.
Selected alignment algorithms. Among the existing plain-
text alignment algorithms, we selected one algorithm for each
category of alignment paradigm we identified. The comparison
between BWA and LAST algorithms is summarized in sec-
tion V-B. Due to its faster alignment time, and higher accuracy
with masked reads, we selected BWA for our performance
evaluation. We also compare with existing hybrid algorithms,
using the recent solution developed by Popic et al. [18],
Balaur. Balaur is a privacy-preserving alignment algorithm
designed for hybrid clouds, which uses locality sensitivity
hashing and kmer voting. This approach uses data encryption
to securely outsource some computations to the public cloud.
Alignment algorithms proven to be secure have been presented
in the literature. Existing solutions are either based on garbled-
circuits [15], or on homomorphic encryption schemes [39],
[40]. However, since those algorithms are not practical enough,
because of their low throughput, we do not compare MaskAl
against those alignment methods.
Criteria for the evaluation of alignment algorithms. Our
first goal is to show that the masking we operate on reads, us-
ing the reads filter, does not significantly degrade the accuracy
of the read alignments. Then, we monitor several performance
metrics, such as the memory consumption, the amount of
network communications, and the computational overhead of
the alignment algorithms. Previous work showed that provid-
ing high alignment performance is critical for an alignment
algorithm to be adopted by the bio-medical community [41].
B. Memory consumption
Balaur requires the indexing of the reference genome,
which takes as a parameter the length of the reads to be
aligned (150, 350, and 1000 nucleotides). This process requires
from 62GB to more than 189GB of memory, depending on
the length of the sequences to align (longer sequences require
less memory). In contrast, MaskAl only needs tens of GB of
memory, which are used to filter and mask the reads.
The amount of RAM needed during the alignment is the
next important parameter for choosing an adequate public
cloud. While Balaur needs between 67GB to 153GB of RAM,
BWA requires between 5.2GB and 5.9GB, a considerable
lower memory requirement (see Figure 6).
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Fig. 6. Comparison peak memory usage of BWA, LAST and Balaur
The peak memory consumption for the score refinement in
the enclave is limited to the 128MB sized Processor Reserved
Memory (PRM). As we did not artificially increase the size of
the PRM by using a SWAP-like technique, due to performance
issues, the 128MB PRM limit is the current upper bound for
MaskAl’s enclave validation.
C. Alignment time - masked alignment
MaskAl’s computation time can be splitted into three parts:
(i) the masked alignment; (ii) the enclave validation (score
refinement); and (iii) the time required for transfers between
the bio-center, the public cloud and the enclave cloud.
Starting with the first step – the masked alignment – we
experienced a big difference between LAST and BWA. LAST
consumes more time the longer the reads are and the higher
their error rate is. BWA needs in average 80% of the time taken
by LAST for the same task with the same amount of threads.
BWA computation time slightly increases for longer reads.
Compared to LAST, BWA computation time is less influenced
by high error rates (see Figure 4). Section V-B presented our
results for this phase of the alignment process, and based on
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those results, we chose to rely on BWA to align the masked
reads.
D. Alignment time - score refinement
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The second step in MaskAl is the score refinement of the
candidate positions, computed on step 1, in enclaves. The score
refinement step itself is divided into several parts: encryption
and decryption of the reads, decryption of the references,
reducing the decrypted reference chunk into the correct size,
performing Smith-Waterman (SW) algorithm and finally en-
crypting and sending the result back to the requesting bio-
center. As SW’s time complexity is cubic, we have to reduce
the workload for it to a minimum. The masked alignment with
BWA has a precision of at least 98% considering a tolerable
offset of +/- 50nt (see Figure 3). Therefore, we reduce the SW
table size to readLength × (readLength + 100) instead of
readLength ∗ referenceLength. The computation time for
the SW algorithm increases linearly when either the reference
chunk, or the read length, increase. As Figure 7) shows, the
computation time increases linearly with the length of the
chunk of reference genome used during the computation. A
longer read length (i.e., 350 nucleotides instead of 150) also
increases the running time of the algorithm.
To complete the computation time evaluation, network
communications have to be taken into account. The data
MaskAl has to transfer is reduced to 4 different types (see
Figure 1). As the four data flows in our architecture are
using mostly unencrypted plain text, MaskAl has a very small
network traffic footprint whose size is depending on the read
length and amount of reads (see Figure 10).
E. Alignment time - repartition
Figure 8 shows the time distribution of MaskAl phases,
considering a network bandwidth of 1Gbit/s and 96 dedicated
SGX enclaves inside an enclave cloud.
Figure 9 compares the computational time for the align-
ment task using BWA, MaskAl and Balaur. The results show
that BWA is the fastest algorithm. Our approach, MaskAl, is
on average 58% slower than BWA. However, BWA runs on
plaintext inputs in public clouds, and is therefore not privacy
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 50
15
0n
t-1
%
15
0n
t-2
%
35
0n
t-1
%
35
0n
t-2
%
10
00
nt
-1
%
10
00
nt
-2
%
Ti
m
e 
(s
)
Read Length and Error Rate
Filtering
NetworkCosts
MaskedAlignment
Cutting
ScoreReﬁnement
Fig. 8. Computation times of MaskAl.
preserving. On the other hand, MaskAl is on average 87%
faster than the current most competitive privacy preserving
alignment algorithm, Balaur.
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F. Network communication
As stated in the computation time evaluation, the net-
working footprint for MaskAl is very small compared to
Balaur. This is a result of using established plain-text alignment
algorithms (BWA) with masked reads. One positive side effect
of masked reads is the fact that a masked read is smaller than
its unmasked pendant. Therefore, the transmission costs for
the masked alignment are smaller compared to the plain text
alignment of unmasked reads.
MaskAl has two important network transfers (see the
overview in Figure 1): (i) the bio-center starts the masked
alignment by sending the files containing the masked reads to
be aligned to a public cloud. After aligning the masked reads,
the bio-center receives SAM-files containing the candidate
positions of the masked reads from the public cloud instances;
and (ii) the bio-center sends the encrypted unmasked reads
and their positions to the enclave cloud to trigger the score
refinement. Finally, the bio-center receives the results of the
score refinement encrypted from the enclave-cloud instances.
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In contrast, Balaur uses keyed-hashes of reads. Balaur
needs significantly more networking resources than MaskAl,
as the hashes have a constant length to be secure. This
results in the amount of data transferred staying more or less
constant even for different read lengths. But nevertheless, it
uses between 5.7GB and 15 GB more bandwidth than MaskAl
(see Figure 10). Interestingly, Balaur uses at least the double
of the bandwidth if the error rate increases from 1% to 2%,
e.g., for reads of 150nt with a 2% error rate Balaur requires
16GB of transferred data, while it only transfers 7.5GB for
1% error rate.
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VIII. RELATED WORK
In contrast to the well researched area of non-privacy-
preserving read mapping algorithms [42], [43], [31], [14],
[32], [44], [13], the field of privacy-preserving read mapping
algorithms is comparatively young. Such algorithms can be
grouped into three different approaches: (i) novel crypto-
graphic primitives; (ii) homomorphic encryption [45]; and (iii)
separating the alignment process in sensitive and insensitive
parts. One example for using new cryptographic primitives to
assure privacy for read mapping is an approach proposed by
Huang et al. [15], derived from Yao’s solution with garbled
circuits for his Millionaires’ problem [46]. The concept of
garbled circuits is proven secure [47] - however it is very slow:
The Smith-Waterman algorithm implementation by Huang et
al. [15] takes 415 seconds to compute two sequences each with
a length of 60nt on two Intel E8400 while producing 1.17GB
of network traffic.
Besides cryptographic primitives like garbled circuits, sev-
eral approaches rely on homomorphic encryption. Homo-
morphic encryption defines for each of the common set of
arithmetic and conditional operations an equivalent set of
operations on the cipher text with the same effect as the plain
text operations after decryption. Therefore, with homomorphic
encryption it is possible to process the cipher text like plain
text. Applied to the problem of sequence alignment, after
encrypting the sequences as well as the reference genome, it is
possible to process the encrypted data like plaintext sequence
and reference.
However, the big drawback of homomorphic encryption
is its high computation overhead. In addition to the high
computational costs, the initial computation (encryption) has
to be done on secured, private hardware (e.g. private clouds)
to assure confidentiality and integrity during the encryption
process. As shown in different papers [18], [48], fully homo-
morphic encryption is not competitive in speed when compared
with traditional approaches like BLAST [32] or bowtie2 [14].
To avoid the drawbacks of homomorphic encryption and
garbled circuits — namely the computation overhead and the
costs to process the computation on private hardware — we
propose a different approach to align reads. Our alignment’s
paradigm consists in differentiating the alignment process
depending on whether the data handled is sensitive or not. To
assure confidentiality and integrity, sensitive data is processed
in private clouds. This can be done by encrypting the sensitive
raw data into insensitive keyed hashes on private clouds,
transferring the hashes to public clouds, and execute there
the heavy read mapping operations with hashes instead of
the raw genome plain text (see Chen et al. [17]). A faster
implementation of a similar concept is introduced by Popic
and Batzoglou in their approach, Balaur [18].
Even though Chen et al.’s [17] and Popic et al.’s [18]
hybrid approaches are leaner than homomorphic or garbled
circuits encryption, they suffer from several disadvantages. Be-
sides the vulnerability of hash-based attack vectors, their main
disadvantages are the need of a self-hosted, maintained and
operated private cloud to assure confidentiality and integrity
regarding the transition process from raw genomic data to
keyed hashes. Compared to those approaches, MaskAl explores
a different paradigm by relying on a filtering method [21] to
identify potentially sensitive nucleotides, and to remove them
from the main alignment step. After that, MaskAl executes an
alignment refinement in remote SGX enclaves.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented MaskAl, a novel read alignment
approach based on the partitioning of reads according to the
detected sensitivity of their nucleotides. MaskAl relies as much
as possible on public clouds, which may host enclaves, and
only execute a low cost filtering step in a private cloud. There-
fore, MaskAl improves over the state of the art of privacy-
preserving alignment methods both in terms of computation
overhead and network communications, even though it relies
on a TEE implementation of Smith-Waterman in SGX enclaves
to refine the masked alignment scores. In addition, MaskAl’s
accuracy is nearly as good as those of unmasked alignment
methods. Since SGX restricts the secure memory per CPU to
128MB only, we limited the maximum read length to 1000nt.
Nevertheless, we do not see this limitation as a problem since
Intel announced the removal of this hardware restriction in
future versions. Otherwise, the score refinement step can also
be moved from SGX to another TEE solution. MaskAl is on
average 87% faster than the most recent privacy-preserving
alignment algorithm (Balaur), mostly thanks to its reduced
communication overhead. In addition, MaskAl consumes sig-
nificantly less RAM during data processing (in average 95%
less). To conclude, MaskAl allows privacy-preserving read
alignment to scale, using public clouds, to maintain a high
throughput to meet the future processing requirements of the
quickly emerging area of DNA analysis.
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